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I. THE OBJECT AND FORM OF A RESTATEMENT
The American Law Institute ("ALI") set out to restate the
general common law in the United States in order to promote clar-
ity and certainty in the common law, which were threatened by "the
ever increasing volume of the decisions of the [different state]
courts, establishing new rules or precedents, and the numerous in-
stances in which the decisions are irreconcilable."1 Clarity and cer-
tainty in the common law across the United States, of course, re-
quires uniformity. Naturally enough, then, the Institute recognized
that a Restatement would promote clarity and certainty in the law
only insofar as "the legal profession accepts the Restatement as
prima facie a correct statement of the general law of the United
States." 2
The Second and Third Restatements recognized additional
objects: to correct errors in earlier restatements, to reflect changes
in the common law since earlier restatements, and, in limited cir-
cumstances, to promote clearly desirable reform. 3 None of these ad-
ditional objects can be secured without first achieving uniformity,
certainty, and clarity. The original object, therefore, remains of
primary importance.
This primary object seems to have clear implications for the
form of a restatement. Uniformity, clarity, and certainty in the law
would be enhanced by a "black-letter" restatement of the law. The
black-letter law could be in the form of specific rules applicable di-
rectly to a set of facts, or in the form of standards, with enough
specificity to give understandable guidance to the decision-maker
called upon to apply the standard to a specific set of facts. The
American Law Institute has taken these implications to heart; each
restatement is in the form of a set of black-letter rules or standards,
with commentary. When there are conflicting specific rules in dif-
ferent states, each restatement adopts one of the rules 4 rather than
formulating a legal directive at a higher level of generality that
could plausibly describe both of the conflicting rules.
In an important sense, then, the primary object of the Re-
statement project limits the form that any restatement can take,
because the goals of uniformity, clarity, and certainty can be
1. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS vol. II introductory cmt., at ix (1934).
2. Id.
3. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS vol. I introductory cmt., at ix (1965).
4. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892C cmt. b (1979) (adopting the minority
rule on whether consent to defendant's criminal conduct bars plaintiff from recovering in tort).
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achieved only if the law is restated with clarity in a form that can
be applied uniformly to yield predictable, certain results.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH RESTATING NEGLIGENCE LAW
A. The Form of Negligence Law
State courts across the United States, with perhaps two ex-
ceptions,5 state the prima facie case for negligence as follows:
1) A duty owed by the defendant to exercise ordinary rea-
sonable care for the safety of the plaintiff or those in
plaintiffs class.
2) Breach of that duty by defendant's failure to act as an or-
dinary reasonable person would act under the circum-
stances.
3) Defendant's breach was a cause-in-fact of an injury to the
plaintiff, and
4) Defendant's breach was a proximate cause of that injury,
which resulted in
5) Legally-cognizable damages. 6
This prima facie case differs remarkably from other prima
facie cases, such as that for battery,7 which provides a clear recipe
for its application because each element of the prima facie case
identifies a fact or a well-defined judgment about facts. In contrast,
for negligence, "duty," a question for decision by the court, seems
like a description of a conclusion the court reaches by a decisional
process unguided by the prima facie formulation itself. The element
simply states there is a duty to exercise due care; it doesn't tell the
courts how to determine whether there is such a duty.
Breach, on the other hand, seems to provide guidance to the
decision-maker in the form of a standard-the conduct of the ordi-
nary, reasonable person. But that standard seems to invoke a very
general judgment about whether the defendant's conduct was "rea-
sonable," without specifying the factors to be taken into account in
determining reasonableness. Moreover, the standard is ordinarily
5. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place
of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L REV. 657-58 nn.1-2 (2001).
6. See NV. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (5th ed.
1984).
7. The prima facie case for battery is (1) a volitional act (2) done with the intent to cause a
harmful or offensive contact to the plaintiff, or the apprehension by the plaintiff of an imminent




applied by a jury, a one-shot decision-maker without prior experi-
ence in applying the standard.
The proximate cause determination seems equally un-
bounded. Formally, the question is separate from the cause-in-fact
question and it is decided by the jury. But the ordinary jury in-
structions do not clearly separate the cause-in-fact question from
the proximate cause question and give little guidance on how either
question is to be resolved.8 Moreover, when judges decide whether
there is sufficient evidence to send the proximate cause question to
a jury, they use a bewildering assortment of tests for proximate
cause-including the "foreseeable consequences" test, the "direct
consequences" test, the "foreseeable risk" test, the "hazard-class"
test, and straight judicial policy judgments.9 None of these tests
seems to give the judge much understandable, alternative-
foreclosing guidance in deciding proximate cause questions.
On the face of it, then, three of the five elements of the neg-
ligence prima facie case seem to pose serious problems for any re-
statement of negligence law. The form of negligence law, in three
out of five of its elements, seems to make it incapable of uniform
8. ALA. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., ALABAMA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-
CIVIL No. 33.00 (1974); PATTERN CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION COMM., ALASKA PATTERN CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS Nos. 3.05, 3.06 (1984); ARK. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL No. 501 (1989); COMM. ON STANDARD JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL, CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL Nos. 3.76, 3.79 (8th ed. 1994); COLO.
SUPREME COURT COMM. ON CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, COLORADO JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL
Nos. 9.26, 9.28, 9.30 (1989); COUNCIL OF SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES OF GA., SUGGESTED PATTERN
JURY INSTRUCTIONS Nos. 1, 2, 6 (3d ed. 1991); IDAHO PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION COMM., IDAHO
JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 230 (1982); ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL
CASES, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL No. 15.01 (1995); IOWA STATE BAR ASS'N:
SPECIAL COMM. ON UNIF. COURT INSTRUCTIONS, IOWA UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, ANNOTATED
No. 2.6 (1982); COMM. ON CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE MD. STATE BAR ASS'N,
MARYLAND CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 19:8 (2d ed. 1984); MICH. SUPREME COURT
COMM. ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MICHIGAN STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL Nos.
15.01, 15.05m, 15.06 (2d ed. 1981); MISS. JUDICIAL COLL. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM.,
MISSISSIPPI MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL Nos. 36.02, 36.03 36.04, 36.06 (1992); STATE BAR
OF NEV., NEVADA PATTERN CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS Nos. 9.1, 9.1A (1966); N. H. CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS Nos. 6.3, 7.1, 7.4, 7.5 (1992); AS'N OF JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF N. Y. COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, NEW YORK PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL Nos. 2:70, 2:72 (1996); N. C. CONFERENCE OF SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES
COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, NORTH CAROLINA PATERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR
CIVIL CASES No. 102.20 (1975); OHIO JUDICIAL CONFERENCE JURY INSTRUCTION COMM., OHIO
JURY INSTRUCTIONS Nos. 7.13, 11.10, 11.20, 11.30 (1983); OR. STATE BAR COMM. ON UNIF. JURY
INSTRUCTIONS Nos. 10.01, 10.01A (1974); VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL No. 5.000
(1998); WASH. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL No. 15.01 (3d ed. 1989); WIS. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS COMM., WISCONSIN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL No. 1500 (1981).
9. For an analysis of the development of each of these different tests, see Patrick J. Kelley,
Proximate Cause, supra note *, at 90-105.
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application from day to day in the same state, let alone across dif-
ferent states. And the form of these three elements of negligence
law seems to frustrate rather than facilitate the clarity and cer-
tainty aimed at by the restatement.
B. Prevailing Descriptive Theories of Negligence Law
Perhaps there is a solution to the restater's problem with
negligence law in descriptive theory, which might be able to inter-
pret or explain negligence law in a way that would make it clear,
certain, and capable of uniform application. Do we find anything in
the prevailing descriptive theories of negligence law that might give
a restater any help? The answer seems to be a resounding "no."
The prevailing theories describing the troublesome elements
in negligence law are permutations or combinations of the compo-
nents in Oliver Wendell Holmes' theory of negligence.10 Consistent
with his commitment to the mid-nineteenth century philosophical
positivism of August Comte and John Stuart Mill," Holmes tried to
formulate a scientific description of the common law of torts.12 In
this enterprise, Holmes attempted to reduce the law to scientific
laws of antecedence and consequence, where the antecedents are
the facts of the case and the consequence is the judicial order con-
cluding the case.' 3 Legal rules of the form "If these facts, then this
judicial consequence" are, then, just a certain subset of the scien-
tific laws of antecedence and consequence. 14 Moreover, for Holmes,
10. Holmes' theory of negligence is part of his broader theory of torts, set out in Lectures III
and IV of O.W. HoLms, JR., THE COMION LAW 63-129 (M.D. Howe ed., 1963) (1881) [hereinafter
HOLTES, THE COMION LAW]. Holmes amplified his tort theory in O.W. Holmes, Jr., Privilege,
Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894). For an analysis of Holmes' theory of torts, see
generally Patrick J. Kelley, A Critical Analysis of Holmes's Theory of Torts, 61 WASH. U. IQ. 681
(1983) [hereinafter Kelley, Holmes's Theory of Torts]. For an analysis of Holmes' application of
his tort theory as a judge on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, see generally Patrick J.
Kelley, Holmes on the Supreme Judicial Court The Theorist as Judge, in THE HISTORY OF THE
LAWIN MAssAcHusETs 275, 288-351 (Russell K Osgood ed., 1992).
11. See generally John Stuart lMill, Auguste Comte and Positivism, in 10 COLLECTED WORKS
OF JOHN STuART MILL 261 (J.M. Robson ed., 1969). For a brief argument that Holmes was com-
mitted to the positivism of Mill and Comte, see Patrick J. Kelley, A Critical Analysis of Holmes's
Theory of Contract, 75 NOTRE DAME L, REV. 1681, 1684-94 (2000).
12. For an argument that Holmes attempted to give the study of torts its final scientific
constitution in order to make it a positive science, see Kelley, Holmes's Theory of Torts, supra
note 10, at 700-08.
13. O.W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L, REV. 457, 457-462 (1897) [hereinaf-
ter Holmes, The Path of the Law]; see also HOLMtES, THiE COMMON LAW, supra note 10, at 44-50.
14. O.W. Holmes, Jr., Codes and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L REV. 1, 4-5 (1870),




the only possible justification for adopting one legal rule rather
than another is public policy-the consequences for the community
from the adopted rule. 15 Legal rules achieve their justifying conse-
quence by influencing people's conduct by threatening them with
certain judicial consequences if they act in certain ways.16 The more
the law is fixed, definite, and certain, the more effective it is in
achieving those consequences. 17
The policy underlying both the law of torts and the criminal
law, according to Holmes, is maximum deterrence of dangerous
conduct consistent with preserving undeterred the freedom to en-
gage in beneficial conduct that is not known to be dangerous. 18 Con-
sistent with this understanding, Holmes explained in the following
way the jury's role in applying the negligence standard. In asking
the jury to determine whether the defendant was negligent, the
judge asks it whether a reasonable man in defendant's position
would have foreseen danger to others from his course of conduct. 19
Asking the jury that question, then, is a way to determine what the
common experience of mankind tells us about the danger of certain
conduct under particular circumstances. 20 That is, it is a way of
eliciting the scientific laws of antecedence and consequence rele-
vant to the defendant's conduct.
To Holmes, the problem was that when the law uses the
standard of the ordinary reasonable man's conduct, or even the test
of the dangers foreseeable by the ordinary reasonable man, the law
is not fixed, definite, or certain enough to guide individual's deci-
sions so as to avoid dangerous conduct. 21 The threat posed by the
law using that standard is too vague: "If you fail to act as an ordi-
nary reasonable person and harm results from your conduct, a
judge will order you to pay money to those injured by your conduct."
A law that specifies more clearly the conduct that would subject the
actor to legal liability, if that conduct causes harm, would be more
effective in deterring dangerous conduct. 22 Holmes therefore urged
that the law should be continually translated from the vague negli-
15. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 10, at 31-33; Holmes, The Path of the Law, su-
pra note 13, at 466-68.
16. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra 10, at 42-43, 88-89.
17. Id. at 89-90.
18. Id. at 115.
19. Id. at 76-77, 86-88.
20. Id. at 119-20.




gence standard into specific legal rules.23 This could happen in two
ways. The legislature could adopt a specific rule of conduct that the
courts would then apply in a tort case, replacing the vague negli-
gence standard.24 Or the trial court, after taking the verdicts of a
number of juries on similar facts, could adopt as the law the specific
rule that juries had applied, leaving thereafter to juries in like
cases only the role of determining the facts.2
In The Common Law, Holmes dealt directly only with the
negligence standard, but his reductive explanation of that trouble-
some standard in terms of foreseeability and implicit policy judg-
ments provided the building blocks for the prevailing descriptive
theories of duty and proximate cause as well. Thus, the modern de-
scriptive theory explaining judicial "duty" determinations in negli-
gence cases is that there is broad universal duty to exercise reason-
able care to avoid conduct threatening foreseeable harm to others.2
When judges refuse to recognize a duty in the teeth of foreseeable
harm to others, they are making an exception, on public policy
grounds, to the broad duty to avoid conduct threatening foreseeable
harm to others.27
The two opposing theories of proximate cause emphasize dif-
ferent tools in Holmes' theoretical toolbox. The hard-line legal re-
alists led by Leon Green2 suggested that the proximate cause limi-
tation on liability for negligence was a cover for a number of defi-
nite but inarticulate legislative policies unrelated to the central two
policies reconciled by the basic negligence standard of conduct.2
The other approach was to suggest that the proximate cause limita-
tion invoked the same basic legislative policies reconciled in the
negligence standard, but with the emphasis on preserving freedom
of action by protecting defendants from crushing and unlimited li-
ability for all the results of a wrongful act.30 This approach again
made use of the foreseeability concept, but this time to limit liabil-
ity, rather than to impose it. If the plaintiffs injury did not come
about from the unreasonable foreseeable risk that made defendant's
23. Id. at 89-103.
24. Id. at 90-91.
25. Id. at 91-103.
26. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, at 356-59; 3 FOWLER HARPER ET AL, THE LW OF
TORTS § 18.1 (2d ed. 1986).
27. HOLiES, THE COMIONLAW, supra note 10, at 91-103.
28. See generally LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927). discussed in Kel-
ley, Proximate Cause, supra note *, at 94-96.
29. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, at 273.
30. See 3 HARPER ET AL., supra note 26, at 137-47.
2001] 1045
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
conduct negligent in the first place, defendant's negligence was not
a proximate cause of plaintiffs injury.
31
Neither "foreseeability" nor "public policy" provides the cer-
tainty and clarity missing from the three troublesome elements in
negligence. "Foreseeability" is notoriously open-ended. As the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court said in Thing v. LaChusa, "there are clear
judicial days on which a court can foresee forever." 32 Conversely, on
a cloudy judicial day you can't foresee for schmatz. Similarly, since
"public policy" neither identifies any particular public policy nor
places any limits on, nor provides any guidelines for, the pursuit of
any public policy, it, too is an open-ended formula. Both "foresee-
ability" and "public policy" work beautifully as explanations of judi-
cial decisions because they are both so open-ended they can be used
to explain any decision, even decisions directly opposed to each
other. For the same reason, neither gives decision-makers much
direct guidance. Both formulations, therefore, undermine clarity
and certainty in the law whenever they are embedded in a legal
standard.
The prevailing descriptive theories of negligence, then, do
not seem to provide any tools a restater could use to avoid the
problems of uncertainty, lack of clarity, and non-uniform applica-
tion that seem to infect three of the five elements of a negligence
claim.
Given the open-ended form of the duty, breach, and proxi-
mate cause elements of negligence, and the lack of any well-
accepted descriptive theory that would give greater certainty and
clarity, the most attractive option to any restater would be to try to
do what Holmes suggested for the breach of duty element: dissolve
each of the open-ended elements into a set of specific sub-rules that
all together provide clarity and certainty. Within the confines of
Holmes' descriptive theory, there seems to be only one alternative
to this approach. One might restate the law of negligence in a dif-
ferent form than other law, thus simply accepting the irreducible
open-endedness of much of the law of negligence, while perhaps
achieving greater certainty and clarity in those parts of negligence
law that can be reduced to specific rules.
31. See id. at 137-47, 466-69.
32. Thing v. LaChusa, 771 P.2d 814, 830 (Cal. 1989).
[Vol. 53:3:10391046
RESTATING DUTY
C. The Problem with Negligence and the Third Restatement:
Proposal and Commentators
Anyone attempting to restate the law of negligence must face
the problem posed by the open-ended form of duty, breach of duty,
and proximate cause. It makes sense, then, to examine Professor
Schwartz's proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Princi-
ples,3" and the three excellent articles by John Goldberg and Ben
Zipursky,34 Kenneth Abraham,3 5 and Jane Stapleton 3s to see how
the different authors deal with this problem.
Gary Schwartz's thoughtful and exhaustively-researched
proposal, if adopted by the ALI, would be its third restatement of
The General Principles of Negligence, replacing the Second Re-
statement, adopted in 1963,3 which had, in turn, replaced the First
Restatement, adopted in 1934.38 One way to discern the basic object
of this Third Restatement of General Principles is to compare the
proposed Third Restatement with the Second. When we do so, we
can identify one major purpose: to identify truly basic principles
and limit this part of the Restatement to those. Thus, the Second
Restatement's General Principles of Negligence had nine topics as
subheadings and sixty-five sections under those nine topics;39 Pro-
fessor Schwartz has just seventeen sections, with no topic sub-
headings in his General Principles of Negligence.40 Professor
Schwartz's introductory note confirms this revised approach to The
General Principles section,41 but with a twist. He says the purpose
is to work through the basic or general principles of just the core of
tort law.42 He identifies the core of tort law as liability for acciden-
tal personal injury and property damage.43 Given this focus of The
General Principles on just the core of tort law, Professor Schwartz
excludes from his discussion liability for emotional distress and
economic loss, as well as liability for unintended personal injuries
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES (Discussion Draft Apr. 5, 1999)
[hereinafter Discussion Draft].
34. Goldberg & Zipurshy, supra note 5.
35. Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence, 54 VAND. L REV. 1187 (2001).
36. Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause.in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences,
54 VAND. L. REV. 941 (2001).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS div. 2, chs. 12-19 (1965).
38. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OFTORTS vol. 11, chs. 12-19 (1934).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 281-328D.
40. Discussion Draft, supra note 33, §§ 3-17.
41. Id. Reporter's Introductory Note, at .xi.
42. Id. Reporter's Introductory Note, at xxi.
43. Id. § 14 Scope Note.
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caused by misrepresentations, 44 and leaves for other parts of The
General Principles "affirmative duty doctrines, doctrines of actual
and proximate causation, and the common law rules of strict liabil-
ity."4
5
Within this intriguingly limited definition of the scope of The
General Principles of Negligence, Professor Schwartz makes three
judgments directly related to our concern with the open-ended form
of three out of the five traditional elements in the prima facie case
for negligence.
First, Professor Schwartz refuses to include in his proposed
Restatement either the traditional prima facie case for negligence,
which had been inserted in the Second Restatement's general prin-
ciples under the heading "Burden of Proof,"46 or the First Restate-
ment's idiosyncratic statement of the elements of negligence,
47
which had been retained but modified in the Second Restatement.
48
Instead, Professor Schwartz states a more limited prima facie case
involving (1) negligent conduct, that is (2) a legal cause of (3) physi-
cal harm.49 Professor Schwartz achieves greater clarity and cer-
tainty in his statement of the elements of a negligence claim, then,
by simply eliminating altogether the troublesome open-ended ele-
ment of duty.
Second, Professor Schwartz attempts to tame the notion of
duty in negligence law by two moves. Within the "core" of negli-
gence law for which Professor Schwartz attempts to identify general
principles (i.e., cases in which defendant's conduct causes plaintiff
personal injury or property damage), he sees that findings of no
duty are "unusual, and are based on judicial recognition of special
problems of principle or policy that justify the withholding of li-
ability."50 The limited number of cases that give rise to those special
problems are, therefore, presumably subject to reduction to specific
no-duty rules. The larger group of cases involving no-duty rules-
negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent causation of
economic loss, and failure to act affirmatively to protect plaintiff
from harm threatened by something other than defendant's con-
duct-are excluded by definition from the scope of Professor
44. Id. § 14 Scope Note.
45. Id. Reporter's Introductory Note, at xxi.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1965).
47. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 281 (1934).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281.
49. Discussion Draft, supra note 33, § 3.
50. Id. § 6.
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Schwartz's Restatement, although he promises to cover the "af-
firmative duty" set of cases later in the project by a restatement in
the form of a general rule and exceptions that themselves take the
form of rules.51
Third, Professor Schwartz carries forward the First and Sec-
ond Restatements" attempts to reduce the seemingly open-ended
ordinary, reasonable person standard to a more manageable and
understandable risk-benefit standard: "Primary factors to consider
in ascertaining whether conduct lacks reasonable care are the fore-
seeable likelihood that it will result in harm, the foreseeable sever-
ity of the harm that may ensue, and the burden that would be borne
by the actor and others if the actor takes precautions that eliminate
or reduce the possibility of harm."52 In his comments to this section,
Professor Schwartz recognizes that even this formulation is still to
a certain extent irreducibly open-ended:
[Tihe approach to negligence described in this section is not one that can be ren-
dered operational in a way that generates certain results. Rather, the approach
identifies important variables for the jury to take into account in determining
whether the actor was negligent; the jury's responsibility is to render an informed
judgment.5 3
John Goldberg and Ben Zipursky, in a brilliant article, take
dead aim at Professor Schwartz's treatment of duty in negligence
law. Their attack proceeds on three fronts. First, they attack Pro-
fessor Schwartz's artificial limitation of the scope of a restatement
of The General Principles of Negligence as inaccurate and
unhelpful. 54 Second, they argue that, in omitting duty from the
prima facie case of negligence, Professor Schwartz ignores the for-
mulation of negligence law adopted in at least forty-eight states.55
Third, they argue that Professor Schwartz's section on duty is not,
in form, a restatement of law that meets the general restatement
form or one that could guide courts in deciding negligence cases.16
Goldberg and Zipursky propose an alternative restatement of part
of The General Principles of Negligence that embodies the tradi-
tional prima facie case for negligence, including duty, and that goes
on to restate The General Principles of duty in negligence law.57
51. Id. § 6 cmt. b.
52. Id. § 4.
53. Id. § 4 cmt. g.
54. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 5, at 664-65.
55. Id. at 658-59, 668-69.
56. Id.
57. Id. app. at 737-50.
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The weighty evidence of daily practice supports Goldberg
and Zipursky's argument that courts use the duty of care as a non-
trivial element of the prima facie case over the whole range of neg-
ligence cases, including those that Schwartz identifies as the core of
tort law.58 In addition, the case law supports their identification of
four different senses in which the courts use the element of duty in
the prima facie case: A "primary sense," which raises the question
of whether "the defendant [was legally] obligated to the plaintiff to
be vigilant of the type of harm suffered by the plaintiff"; 9 (2) An
alternative sense, which raises the question of whether the "defen-
dant's faulty conduct constitutes the breach of a duty to the plain-
tiff, rather than the breach of a duty owed to another";60 (3) Another
alternative sense in which the court finds no duty but simply ex-
presses the judgment that, on the facts of the case, no reasonable
jury could find that the defendant breached his duty to behave rea-
sonably toward the plaintiff;61 (4) Another alternative sense, in
which courts, for policy reasons, exempt a defendant from liability
even though the plaintiff has satisfied each of the elements of the
prima facie case and the defendant has no previously specified af-
firmative defense. 62
So far, so good. But on the next and most crucial step in their
argument, Goldberg and Zipursky seem to stumble. For at this
point, they claim that the doctrine of duty, as they have described
it, is what solves the problem with the form of negligence law and
makes the law of negligence law in the full sense. They argue as
follows:
Duty in the primary sense is important because it links negligence and liability.
The reason one person's negligence generates liability for the injuries it causes to
another is that the negligent party has a duty of care toward the other, to avoid
causing that sort of injury. The breach of the duty causing the injury generates li-
ability. We put this forward as a point of principle, but not as a point of moral
principle. It is a point of legal principle, for it is only duties recognized by courts
that generate liability. Areas in which negligence causing injury are non-
actionable are (at least at the level of basic doctrine) those in which the defendant
did not have any duty to the plaintiff to be prudent with regard to the interests in
question. It is because the common law of torts itself contains a cohesive doctrine
of duty that negligence doctrine contains general principles and constitutes a body
of law, not simply policy-generated pockets of rule-like decisions.G3
58. Id. at 670-72.
59. Id. app. § D cmt. a, at 739.
60. Id. app. § D cmt. d, at 741.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 731.
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But this argument solves the problem of form in only a triv-
ial sense, by showing a plausible logical relationship between duty,
unreasonable conduct, and liability. And, since the duty is identi-
fied exclusively as a legal duty recognized by the courts in deter-
mining whether to recognize liability, the logical relationship is al-
ways established simply by the decision of the court itself. This,
then, is a purely formal solution to the rule-of-law problem with
duty, as it works whatever substantive content the courts give to
"duty," for whatever reason. This analysis embodies a conceptual
formalism that runs throughout Goldberg and Zipursky's paper.64
That formalism can be seen most clearly, perhaps, in their unwill-
ingness to judge or argue about which approach, rule, or decision is
better. Instead, Goldberg and Zipursky often argue from the fact
that a particular duty decision was made, "whether that decision
was right or not," to a conclusion about the formal structure of duty
questions.
65
This refusal to evaluate affects their descriptive theory of the
duty element, which adopts general formulations at the descriptive
level that are so inescapably indeterminate that they can describe
opposing decisions of the same issue. They recognize that a large
number of duty questions are resolvable simply by reference to pre-
viously-announced specific judicial rules. 6  But there are cases not
covered by the specific rules. In those, they say, the courts resolve
duty questions by reference to a set of factors,6 including foresee-
able harm,68 the relationship between the parties, 69 the professional
or institutional setting,70 "the extent to which recognition of an ob-
ligation to the plaintiff would impede the satisfaction of obligations
already owed by the defendant to others,"71 and "the extent to which
social norms treat the conduct demanded of the defendant as re-
quired rather than merely advisable."72 Foreseeable harm, of
course, is an open-ended term, and the formulation of the third and
fourth factors using the arbitrary formulation "the extent to which"
makes each of those factors relatively indeterminate. Although the
64. See id. at 716 (assumption that doctrinal categories of negligence law necessarily have
distinct, different core meanings); id. at 712-13 (formalist justification of judge-jury allocation of
functions).
65. See id. at 680; see also id. at 716.
66. Id. app. § D cmt. b, at 740.








resulting description is more structured and determinate than the
prevailing "public policy" explanation, in which particular public
policies are not identified at all, still, this description does not make
negligence law clear, certain, and capable of uniform application
because it fails to give definite guidance to actors before the fact or
to judges after the fact.
Finally, Goldberg and Zipursky include in their descriptive
theory an almost completely open-ended "policy-based liability ex-
emption."73 This is limited to undefined "unusual circumstances, '74
but the exemption in this form seems to make their description of
the duty element in negligence law almost as open-ended and inde-
terminate as the prevailing theory that there is a general duty to
those foreseeably endangered by defendant's conduct, subject to a
set of no-duty rules based on undefined public policies. Goldberg
and Zipursky seem to solve this problem by another formalist ar-
gument: These cases of policy-based exemptions from liability do
not apply the duty concept in its primary sense, and hence do not
affect the structure of the law dealing with duty in that sense.
7 5
This solution works only on the assumption that analytical distinc-
tions in a descriptive theory are or can be translated into practi-
cally effective distinctions within the institution described. Here, it
is difficult to see how this class of cases can be defined in a way
that could give understandable guidance to actors and courts, with-
out both a more specific description of the "unusual circumstances"
triggering the policy-based exemption and an intelligible statement
of the policies at work.
Professor Abraham carefully focuses directly on the rule-of-
law problems with the breach of duty standard and its application
by the jury.76 In an article that could have been written by the
ghost of Holmes, he laments the lawless nature of jury verdicts in
"unbounded" negligence cases where there is no prior custom, stat-
ute, or professional standard of conduct to limit and guide the
jury.77 In those unbounded cases, juries create the norm that they
then apply, retroactively, to defendant's conduct.78 The effectiveness
of the law is undermined by these unbounded cases, because the
jury verdict is based on no knowable prior rule and does not become
73. Id. app. § E, at 749.
74. Id.
75. Id. app. § D cmt. a, at 739-40.
76. Abraham, supra note 35, at 1189 & n.5.
77. Id. at 1191-94.
78. Id. at 1191.
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a rule to be applied in the future.79 The efficiency of the law in de-
terring unwanted conduct is undermined, since no one can know in
advance what conduct will be sanctioned in an unbounded case.80
The legitimacy of the law is, to a certain extent, also called into
question.81 Abraham concludes that we should do all we can to
eliminate unbounded negligence cases. He encourages attempts to
achieve greater certainty, stability, and clarity in the law by limit-
ing, when possible, negligence claims to bounded negligence cases
and, for other claims, adopting strict liability or strict no-liability
rules that are fixed, definite, and certain.
82
Professor Stapleton drew the seemingly impossible task of
commenting on a part of the Third Restatement that has not been
written yet-the part restating cause-in-fact and proximate cause.
Her thoughtful paper attempts to solve rule-of-law problems with
both duty and proximate cause. 83 For present purposes, I will focus
just on her discussion of proximate cause.
Professor Stapleton proposes that we clarify the law related
to proximate cause in two ways. First, we should clearly distinguish
between the factual question of the causal relation between defen-
dant's conduct and plaintiffs injury and the purely normative ques-
tion, misleadingly labeled "proximate cause," of the proper limits on
liability for harm actually caused by defendant's conduct.84 Second,
this normative question mimics or repeats the legal duty question,
but it is decided in the United States by the jury rather than the
judge.8 5 We can clarify the law of proximate cause and make it more
uniform in application by doing two things: first, we must identify
the factors or "legal concerns" deemed relevant by the courts for
resolving the normative question of the scope of liability for conse-
quences of breach,8 6 and, second, we must craft jury instructions
that would tell the jury about these factors, when relevant to the
particular negligence claim before the jury.
87
Following the analytical approaches she used so brilliantly
in an earlier work dealing with duty cases,88 Professor Stapleton
79. Id. at 1192, 1194.
80. Id. at 1202-03.
81. Id. at 1203-06.
82. Id. at 1221-23.
83. Stapleton, supra note 36, at 944.
84. Id. at 957-69.
85. Id. at 954-57.
86. Id. at 956-57.
87. Id.
88. See generally Jane Stapleton, Duty of Care Factors A Selection from the Judicial Menus,
in THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 59 (Peter Cane & Jane Stapleton eds., 1998).
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attempts to identify the set of "legal concerns" relevant to deter-
mining the scope of liability for the consequences of breach. Just as
in her duty paper, she concludes that these factors are not all con-
sequentialist policy judgments, 89 as the prevailing wisdom would
have it. These legal concerns include, among others, the following:
1) Whether the consequence is wholly "disproportionate" to
the degree of wrongfulness involved in the breach.
2) The role of compounded bad luck and coincidence in the
interval between breach and outcome.
3) The social costs (including legal administration) of in-
cluding such consequences within the scope of liability.
4) The dignity and integrity of the legal system.
5) The concern with the freedom of action of the plain-
tiff/defendant.
6) Any explicit or implicit undertakings by the defendant.
7) Whether the defendant was acting in pursuit of commer-
cial profit.
8) The moral expectations of society of the defendant. 90
Professor Stapleton denies the prevailing theory's claim that
proximate cause decisions are nothing but policy-based judgments,
but she accepts that theory's insistence that there is no single, in-
telligible judgment about the facts called for by the proximate cause
inquiry. 91 She therefore attempts to derive from the cases a set of
different normative judgments that seem to underlie judicial deci-
sions in proximate cause cases. But clarifying the different norma-
tive grounds for judges' proximate cause decisions and incorporat-
ing those "legal concerns" in instructions to the jury would make
negligence law less clear and less certain than it is today.
Today, although proximate cause is technically a question for
the jury, in most states the jury is not given instructions that sepa-
rate the proximate cause question from the cause-in-fact question. 92
These blank instructions effectively reserve to the court the deci-
sion of proximate cause questions. 93 Judges have to give intelligible
reasons for their decisions, and their decisions are reviewable on
appeal. This leads to a semblance of certainty about how proximate
cause cases will be decided. To give these questions to juries, one-
89. Stapleton, supra note 36, at 985-87.
90. Id. at 1007-09.
91. Id. at 948-49, 985-87, 1007-09.
92. See supra note 8 (citing various pattern jury instructions).




shot decision-makers, with instructions calling for them to make
normative decisions under one or more of the relatively open-ended
normative standards identified by Professor Stapleton, would seem
to make the law less certain and less predictable.
Professor Stapleton, like Professors Goldberg and Zipursky,
adopts a methodology that gives us a descriptive theory that ex-
plains judicial decisions in terms of the application in an individual
case of one or more of a set of relevant factors. This laundry-list ap-
proach seems to reflect a methodology that accepts as equally valid
and equally relevant all judicial decisions on the topic. Using this
methodology in restating the law of the United States on any diffi-
cult topic precludes a single, clear statement of the law, for the
methodology provides no basis for determining that some cases are
right, or better-reasoned than other cases. The idea of objective,
scientific legal scholarship thus seems to complicate our search for
a clear and certain restatement of the law of negligence. 4
Professor Schwartz and the four commentators discussed
here all grappled conscientiously with the rule-of-law problems for
a restatement of negligence posed by the open-ended form of duty,
breach, and proximate cause as elements of the negligence cause of
action. To my mind, none of these efforts succeeds, because each
author attempts to resolve the problem largely within the concep-
tual structure and using the conceptual tools of the prevailing de-
scriptive theory we have inherited from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
Under that theory, duties are legal duties defined by the courts,
and recognized or rejected on the basis of public policy. Under that
theory, determinations of negligence are made by juries, after the
injury, based either on the jury's unguided judgment about the
"reasonableness" of defendant's conduct or the jury's relatively un-
guided judgments about foreseeable harm and a public policy that
balances the social costs and the social benefits of defendant's con-
duct. Under that theory, proximate cause has nothing to do with
causation, but simply masks a judgment, based on public policy or
foreseeability, to limit liability for certain consequences of negligent
conduct. Under these theoretical descriptions of the open-ended
elements in negligence law, the law cannot achieve the rule-of-law
goals of certainty, clarity, and uniform application. The only way to
achieve those goals, as Professor Abraham and Oliver Wendell
94. Compare John Finnis' proposed social science methodology. JOHN FINNis, NATURAL
LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 3-22 (1980); see also Patrick J. Kelley, Who Decides?, supra note *
(applying Finnis' social science methodology to tort theory).
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Holmes recognized, is to reduce each of these open-ended terms to a
set of specific legal rules.
As long as we operate within the conceptual box Holmes has
put us in, this is the best we can do. And, given the practical impos-
sibility of reducing all of negligence law to a set of specific rules,
our best does not seem to be possible, as the air of foredoomed fail-
ure hovering over Professor Abraham's proposed reform suggests.
Are we forced to conclude that there is a fundamental incompati-
bility between our rule-of-law concerns and the modern law of neg-
ligence?
I suggest we start thinking outside the box. One of the ways
we can do so is to look at negligence law prior to Holmes's descrip-
tive theory of negligence. If we could find out why and how the
open-ended concepts crept into negligence law, perhaps we could
discover other ways to resolve our rule-of-law problems.
III. ORIGINS OF MODERN NEGLIGENCE LAW
In 1881, in The Common Law,95 Holmes constructed the
theoretical box in which we find ourselves. It makes sense, then, if
we want to think outside that box, to look at negligence law as it
developed before Holmes re-described it in terms of foreseeable
danger and public policy.
A. The General Duty of Care and the Ordinary Reasonable Man
Standard
The combined efforts of two British scholars, S.F.C. Milsom 96
and M.J. Prichard,97 have clarified the development of the modern
law of negligence. They identified two elements as critically impor-
tant in the emergence of early negligence law in the first half of the
nineteenth century; first, the ordinary reasonable man standard of
conduct, applied by the jury, and second, the technique of pleading
a general duty of care. It makes sense, therefore, to begin a theo-
retical analysis of early negligence law by focusing on these two
elements.
95. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 10.
96. See generally S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW (2d ad.
1981).




Milsom argues that, for centuries, the jury had the ultimate
say in determining whether defendant's conduct was wrongful.93
This was so because the defendant could deny plaintiffs claim of
wrongfulness-a claim implicit in trespass and explicit in trespass
on the case-by simply pleading the general issue: "Not guilty."99
The case would then be sent out to the county for the jury to decide.
The jury's decision was effectively insulated from review by the
court back at Westminster. In the eighteenth century, procedures
developed by which the litigants could bring back to the court at
Westminster the facts developed at the jury trial.100 This threatened
the primacy of the jury in deciding whether defendant's conduct
was wrongful. Further, it threatened to reduce the law of torts to a
multitude of very specific legal rules of conduct, as the courts at
Westminster ruled as a matter of law on individual cases brought
back from the jury.
The ordinary reasonable man standard of conduct in negli-
gence cases responded to both of these threats. The formal legal
statement of the standard as the conduct of the ordinary reasonable
man (or "the man of ordinary prudence") was pitched at a high level
of generality. Adherence of the law to this level of generality could
effectively keep the judges from reviewing jury verdicts on the facts
developed at trial, for the judges did not need to decide as a matter
of law whether certain conduct was negligent. All they needed to
decide was whether the jury could reasonably find that the conduct
was not that of the ordinary reasonable man. Thus, the develop-
ment of the ordinary reasonable man standard blunted the threat
that the eighteenth century development of procedures for review-
ing jury verdicts would ultimately reduce the law of torts to a mul-
titude of specific legal rules of conduct. At the same time, it helped
maintain the primacy of the jury in determining whether defen-
dant's conduct was wrongful.
But what did the judges who developed the early law of neg-
ligence believe the ordinary reasonable man standard meant? We
may be better able to answer that question when we return to it
after exploring the judicial development of the duty of care plead-
ing.
Prichard identifies the early common carrier cases of Ansell
v. Waterhouse10 ' in 1817 and Bretherton v. Wood 2 in 1821 as the
98. 'iLSOM, supra note 96, at 296-300.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 397; PRICHARD, supra note 97, at 15-16.
101. AnseU v. Waterhouse, 105 Eng. Rep. 1286 (K.B. 1817).
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key cases in developing the general duty of care pleading. 103 In both
of those cases, the judges seemed to understand the pleaded general
duty as equivalent to a pleaded custom of the realm, but without
pleading the specific custom. 0 4 Pleading a general duty was obvi-
ously safer for the plaintiffs attorney than attempting at his cli-
ent's peril to plead the proper specific custom of the realm. Given
its attraction for plaintiffs attorneys, it is not surprising that the
general duty allegation spread rapidly from the common carrier
cases to other negligence cases in the early nineteenth century.
The judges who authorized this rapid spread may have seen
a related advantage for the legal system as a whole, for the general
duty of care allegation helped resolve a practical pleading problem
in the common law. The general duty allegation provided a broad
umbrella category under which all sorts of specific facts could be
pleaded. Recognition of this broad category avoided the multiple
categories that would have developed if customs of the realm had to
be pleaded specifically under the new procedural conditions that
encouraged accurate fact pleading. With this broad umbrella cate-
gory, the courts avoided getting bogged down in the minutiae of
specifically pleaded customs, with the attendant risk of transferring
from the jury to the courts the responsibility for determining the
standard of behavior. The general duty pleading, then, like the or-
dinary reasonable man standard, helped maintain the jury's his-
toric role in determining whether defendant's conduct was wrong-
ful.
The court's invocation of the custom of the realm in those
early duty of care cases provides the basis for understanding the
"duty of care" in negligence as not just a legal duty imposed by leg-
islators or judges based on their views of desirable social policy.
This, of course, is the modern view, but it ignores an earlier under-
standing of the appropriate bases for judicial decision-the under-
standing prevalent at the time the general duty of care pleading
first appeared. Under that view, judges were to look to the preex-
isting customs and mores of the community to resolve disputes. The
102. Bretherton v. Wood, 129 Eng. Rep. 1203 (Ex. Ch. 1821).
103. PRICHARD, supra note 97, at 28-29.
104. Lord Ellenborough in Ansell characterized the general duty pleading there as "tanta.
mount: to pleading custom of the realm. Ansell, 105 Eng. Rep. at 1288. All the courts in the
Exchequer Chamber accepted this reasoning in Bretherton, where Chief Justice Dallas argued,
"This action is on the case against a common carrier, upon whom a duty is imposed by the cus-
tom of the realm, or in other words, by the common law, to carry and convey their goods or pas.
sengers safely and securely ... " Bretherton, 129 Eng. Rep. at 1206.
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custom of the realm, they thought, was the common law. 05 This
understanding guided the judges who first adopted the general duty
of care pleading, for they recognized the historical continuity be-
tween the older custom of the realm pleading and this new duty of
care pleading. From this, one may conclude that the early duty of
care pleading was understood as a method of referring in a general
way to the specific preexisting customs, conventions, and coordi-
nating practices of the community.106 Understood in that way, the
duty terminology is not an empty formula. If tort liability is im-
posed to redress a private wrong, defined by reference to the practi-
cal coordination norms of the community, it seems only natural to
characterize that wrong as breach of a duty owed by defendant to
plaintiff. You wrong someone when you fail to give him what is
"due" him, that is, when you fail to fulfill your "duty" to him. There
is not circularity or judicial ipse dixit here, because the courts rea-
105. Beaulieu v. Finglam, Y.B. 2 Hen. 4, fol. 18, pl. 6 (1401), reprinted in C.H.S. FIFOOT,
HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND CONTRACT 166 (1949) ('o which ToTA
CURIA said: Answer over; for the common custom of the realm is the common law of the realm.").
The practice of declaring against common carriers on the custom of the realm is
as ancient as the law itself, and was uniformly adopted until somewhere about
the time of Dale v. Hall. Since then it has been usual not to declare in this
form, but in contract; yet the modern use does not supersede, although it has
supplanted the former practice . . . .This, then, [is] in substance an action
founded on the custom of the realm in tort,... against all or any of the parties
liable.
Ansell, 105 Eng. Rep. at 1288 (Lord Ellenborough, C.J.).
This action is on the case against a common carrier, upon whom a duty is im-
posed by the custom of the realm, or in other words, by the common law, to
carry and convey their goods or passengers safely and securely, so that, by their
negligence or default, no injury or damage happen. A breach of this duty is a
breach of the law, which action wants not the aid of a contract to support it.
Bretherton, 129 Eng. Rep. at 1206 (Dallas, C.J.). See generally 1 WLLLAM BLACiSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *62-*92.
106. See Ansell, 105 Eng. Rep. at 1289 (Abbott, J.) ("In the present case, however, the duty,
as it seems to me, attaches entirely on the defendant, from the general obligation cast on him by
the law as a common carrier .... And it is clear, that a common carrier may be charged ex de-
licto.").
This action is founded on that which is collateral to contract; for the terms of
contract with a common carrier, provided they do not vary his general responsi-
bility, are quite immaterial .... Now, according to the ancient law, a common
carrier is, in the nature of a public officer, bound to the discharge of a general
duty; and any person who undertakes it is answerable as such. So innkeepers
are considered in the same light .... It seems to me, therefore, that although
the law will raise a contract with a common carrier to be answerable for the
careful conveyance of his passenger, nevertheless he may be charged in an ac-
tion upon the case for a breach of his duty; and that the declaration in question
is not formed upon the implied contract, but on the general obligation of law
arising from the defendant's duty as a common carrier.
Id. at 1289-90 (Holroyd, J.); see also Bretherton, 129 Eng. Rep. at 1207 (Dallas, C.J.) ("In the
present case, a duty was imposed on the Defendants which did not arise by the contract, but by
the custom or common law of England."); Readhead v. Midland Ry. Co., 2 LR-Q.B. 412, 421
(1867), afd, 4 L.R-Q.B. 379, 382 (1869) (Montague Smith, J.).
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son from pre-judicial community-defined obligations, based on the
accepted coordination norms of the community, to a conclusion
about legally redressing a wrong understood as a breach of that
community-defined obligation.
This, in turn, provides a basis for understanding why the
judges were so protective of the jury's role in negligence cases. If
the basic test of wrongfulness is whether defendant's conduct was
contrary to accepted, established patterns for coordinating activity
in a particular community, selecting a group of people from that
community and asking them whether defendant acted as an ordi-
nary reasonable man (or a man of ordinary prudence) would have
acted seems to be an excellent method for applying that test.
Furthermore, that procedure and that standard provide a
solution to the basic problem of extending tort liability to cases in
which the defendant intended no contact with the plaintiff. It may
be impossible to reduce to legal rules the multitude of mores and
patterns of conduct in particular communities concerning coordina-
tion of conduct not intended to cause contact with others. By
adopting the jury-applied standard of the ordinary reasonable
man's conduct, the judges did not need to know the patterns or mo-
res themselves in any detail; they did not need to risk adopting as
the law of England a pattern prevalent only in one geographical
area; and they did not run the risk of stating the pattern of ex-
pected conduct too broadly in a formal rule that might include other
situations governed by different expectations based on different so-
cial rules.
As negligence law originally developed, then, neither the
general duty of care pleading nor the ordinary reasonable man
standard were intended to be open-ended invitations to unguided
after-the-fact normative judgments by judges and juries. Instead,
both were what we might call covering generalities, like the older
common-law pleading formulas, intended to elicit judgments about
specific preexisting social safety conventions. The duty of care
pleading called on the judge to determine whether, on the facts
pleaded, there was any social convention applicable to defendant's
conduct, intended to protect people like plaintiff, that required the
defendant to avoid creating the hazard that resulted in harm to the
plaintiff. The ordinary reasonable man standard called on the jury
to determine whether, on the facts as they found them, the defen-





The courts developed a proximate cause doctrine shortly af-
ter they put in place the primary elements of a general duty of care
and the ordinary reasonable man standard. It seemed to come
about in the following way.
The general duty of care pleading in a negligence case was a
brilliant solution to a pleading problem under the old common law,
which was fundamentally a law of pleading. The same forces cre-
ating the problem that the duty of care pleading solved, however,
were transforming the common law into substantive law. Almost as
soon as the general duty of care pleading was adopted, judges lost
sight of its function as a covering generality or pleading formula
and treated it as a substantive legal concept-a reified general duty
of care to others. 107 This left the judges with no way to make the
specific judgments about particular social conventions and their
purposes obviously called for under the original understanding of
the duty of care pleading. The proximate cause doctrine was one of
four doctrines that developed in response to this under-elaborated
notion of duty. Proximate cause came in along with contributory
negligence, privity, and the legislative purpose limitation on statu-
tory negligence liability in the 1840s and 1850s, and proximate
cause doctrine was developed by the courts over the remaining
years of the nineteenth century.
Looking back on that development in 1909, Joseph W. Bing-
ham, an early legal realist, brilliantly cut through the varied and
confusing explanations given by the courts to the underlying core of
the proximate cause doctrine. 0 8 He concluded, from an intensive
analysis of a series of specific cases, that "in those cases decided
against defendant, the prevention throughout of the concrete se-
quence which produced the damage was within the limits of the
purposes for which the unperformed duty was imposed; in those
decided in favor of defendant, it was not within those limits."0 9 If
we combine Bingham's analysis of proximate cause as dependent on
the purposes of the specific duty of care in a negligence case with
the original understanding of the nature of the specific duties re-
107. See Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 404-06 (Ex. 1842) (finding that "duty"
in tort must be a general duty to all, so it cannot be based on contract without privity).
108. Joseph W. Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning "Legal Cause" at Common Law, 9
COLUM. L. RPv. 16, 23-37 (1909).
109. Id. at 35.
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ferred to by the general duty of care pleading, we can amplify Bing-
ham's explanation of nineteenth century proximate cause cases.
One need only see the duties in the first instance, not as ju-
dicially-defined duties, but as social obligations derived from the
community's accepted ways of doing things. Community standards
of coordinating behavior may be developed so that certain goods can
be achieved by some, or certain evils can be avoided by others, if
everyone follows the practice. For example, if everyone drives on
the left, collisions can be avoided and everyone can get where they
are going more quickly and safely. Everyone engaged in the practice
understands what those purposes are. For the practice to give rise
to a claim of wrong, therefore, the plaintiff must be within the
group of those whose interests the practice was developed to pro-
tect, and the hazard by which he was harmed must be one that the
practice was developed to avoid.
Bingham's duty-purpose analysis applies without tautology
to social duties associated with a community's coordinating conven-
tions or practices. Plaintiff is wronged if she is harmed when defen-
dant breaches a social convention whose purpose is to protect peo-
ple like the plaintiff from that kind of harm. Thus, the hazard/class
test applied by the courts to determine when breach of a criminal
statute will be deemed to be negligence per se 10 is just one applica-
tion of a more pervasive structure, embodied in "proximate cause"
cases in negligence as well.
This explains the relatively greater role of the judge vis-a-vis
the jury in resolving proximate cause issues. Courts in the nine-
teenth century"' (and courts today, to a great extent) 112 decided
proximate cause questions, more often than not, as matters of law,
leaving few proximate cause issues for the jury. At first glance, this
seems puzzling even under the above theory. If the negligence is-
sue, which involves the question of the existence and content of
preexistent community norms, is ordinarily left to the jury as a rep-
resentative cross-section of the community, why should not the
proximate cause issue, which involves the purposes of preexistent
community norms, also be left to the jury?
110. For a description of the development of this test, see Kelley, Who Decides?, supra note *,
at 358-63.
111. See, e.g., Carter v. Towne, 98 Mass. 567, 568-69 (1868); Denny v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 79
Mass. (13 Gray) 481, 485-87 (1859).
112. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. City of Buffalo, (In re Kinsman Transit Co.), 388 F.2d 821, 824
(2d Cir. 1968); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928). See, e.g.,
CLARENCE MORRIS & C. ROBERT MORRIS, JR., MORRIS ON TORTS 198-99 (2d ed. 1980).
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A closer analysis, however, may resolve the puzzle. Negli-
gence issues often involve complex and difficult questions concern-
ing the scope and application of community standards. It makes
sense to ask the jury whether, under the specific circumstances of
the case, defendant violated an applicable community norm of be-
havior. Furthermore, this normative question is so closely tied to a
precise determination of all the facts of the case that separating the
two questions will likely lead to confusion and error. The proximate
cause issue is less closely tied to facts, since it focuses on the pur-
pose, not the application, of the relevant community norm. Moreo-
ver, the purpose questions underlying proximate cause issues are
ordinarily easy questions on which reasonable people would all
agree. The apparently greater judicial deference to the jury on neg-
ligence issues, then, is not a real difference, since the different re-
sults stem from application of the usual standard for allocating de-
cisions between the judge and the jury. The different results simply
reflect differences in the nature of the two issues: the negligence
issue involves simple questions with often complex, fact-specific
answers; the proximate cause issue involves a complex question
with simple answers. The differences further suggest that a jury
decision may be less reliable on proximate cause issues than on
negligence issues. It is one thing to ask the jury, as a cross-section
of the community, whether the defendant's acts violate a commu-
nity standard of conduct; it is quite another thing to ask that cross-
section to delineate the purpose of that community standard. By
living in the community, the jury would tend to know the commu-
nity's standards and patterns of conduct. The jury might not be
well-suited to answer the second question, however, because the
answer requires an ability to reason and analyze-an ability to
probe beneath the rules and patterns of conduct themselves to their
function and purpose in a system of mutually coordinated, coopera-
tive behavior.
C. Early Negligence Law and the Rule of Law
The early history of negligence law before its theoretical re-
interpretation by Holmes in 1880 shows us a legal structure that
satisfies the rule-of-law concerns that individual cases be decided
by the application of rules adopted prior to the incident giving rise
to the claim, and that those rules be clear and certain. Negligence
law was a way of incorporating into the law the set of specific rules
and practices adopted and acted upon by a particular community in
order to coordinate conduct within that community safely. Those
2001] 1063
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
rules and practices were adopted prior to the incident and gave
members of that community clear and certain guidance about how
to act in situations governed by them. As practices and conventions
may vary from community to community, those differing social
rules will not be uniformly applied under the negligence formula,
but the formula itself, when applied according to its original pur-
poses, will achieve a more fundamental uniformity: each case will
be decided based on the relevant pre-existing social convention in
that particular community. Thus, applying the same negligence
standard, a motorist driving in the left lane of a two-lane highway
in the United States may be held to be negligent, while a motorist
driving in the right lane of a two-lane highway in England may be
held to be negligent.
IV. RESTATING MODERN NEGLIGENCE LAW TO RESOLVE
RULE-OF-LAW PROBLEMS
The development of negligence law over the last 120 years
has been influenced by Holmes' theoretical description in terms of
foreseeable danger and public policy. Those terms have crept into
judges' opinions. Moreover, the England of 1830 is a far cry from
the United States of today, with its instantaneous communication,
fast transportation, and concentration of millions of culturally di-
verse people in small urban areas. Given all these changes, is it
possible or desirable to restate negligence law in terms of breach of
pre-existing community safety conventions?
Most of the modern law of negligence can still be described in
pre-Holmesian terms. 113 In the vast majority of states, the jury is
instructed that the negligence standard is the conduct of the ordi-
nary reasonable person, or some variant of that standard." 4 Al-
though proximate cause is technically a question for the jury, in
most states the jury is not given instructions that separate the
proximate cause question from the cause-in-fact question." 5 These
blank instructions effectively reserve the decision of difficult
proximate cause questions for the court. Foreseeability, in all its
technical open-endedness, is therefore reserved to the courts. And
there is good reason to believe that most judicial decisions on fore-
113. See generally Kelley, Who Decides?, supra note *, at 351-63.
114. See id. at 382-83 & n.248.
115. See supra note 8 (collecting pattern jury instructions).
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seeability are guided by the judge's knowledge of the relevant pre-
existing social conventions.
Both foreseeable risk and foreseeable harm are seemingly ir-
reducibly open-ended, for the harm or danger one can foresee from
one's actions depends on one's incentives, intelligence, knowledge,
and experience. In practice, however, courts seem to cut down the
open-endedness of simple foreseeability by deciding foreseeability
questions from the vantage point of one who knows the governing
safety conventions and their purposes. In using foreseeable risk as
one element of the Carroll Towing Co. test of negligence, for in-
stance, most courts take seriously the idea that foreseeability must
be determined from the standpoint of the ordinary reasonable per-
son in defendant's position before the accident.11 6 In deciding what
an ordinary reasonable person in that position would foresee,
judges often look to what people in that position would ordinarily
do. If the defendant has breached a conventional practice intended
to protect against this kind of harm, the judge can easily find that
an ordinary person in defendant's position would have foreseen se-
rious harm from that breach. 117 If the defendant has followed com-
mon, accepted practice, the judge can easily find that an ordinary
person in defendant's position would not have foreseen an unrea-
sonable risk of harm from that conduct. 118
Similarly, the most common example used to explain the un-
reasonable foreseeable risk test in proximate cause depends for its
persuasiveness on our situating it within known community safety
conventions. The classic example is this. Defendant gives a loaded
gun to a young child, who drops it on her foot. Because the injury
was not within the unreasonable foreseeable risk of injury from dis-
116. See generally WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OFTORTS 146(4th ed. 1971).
117. See, e.g., Alaska Freight Lines v. Harry, 220 F.2d 272, 276.77 (9th Cir. 1955) (finding
that a defendant reasonably could have foreseen that, over the course of a long trip and in
weather conditions where ice accumulation was likely, ice might dangerously fall from the top of
the truck); Crane v. Smith, 144 P.2d 356, 363-64 (Cal. 1944) (finding that defendant reasonably
should have known that a young child unaware of the risk could insert her finger into the coffee
grinder and thereby injure herself); Schaut v. Borough of St. Mary's, 14 A.2d 583, 585 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1940) (finding that defendant reasonably could have foreseen that stakes placed in property
abutting a sidewalk might pose a danger to passersby).
118. See, e.g., Clinton v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 344 N.E.2d 509, 515 (Il. App. Ct. 1976)
(finding no liability where defendant complied with safety regulations in installing wires and
where it was not foreseeable that decedent would come in contact with a live wire); Van Skike v.
Zussman, 318 N.E.2d 244, 247-48 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (finding no liability where flammable ciga-
rette lighter fluid sold to a young child was not inherently dangerous and where it was not fore-
seeable that the child would attempt to ignite the fluid with a nonfunctional toy lighter); Taylor
v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 241 So. 2d 564, 566-67 (La. Ct. App. 1970) (finding no liability where
defendant took reasonable precaution to prevent accidental rolling of car).
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charge of the gun that made the defendant's conduct negligent in
the first place, defendant's negligence is not a proximate cause of
plaintiffs injured foot.119 The persuasiveness of this example, how-
ever, is parasitic on our understanding of the existence and purpose
of the social norm prohibiting giving loaded guns to children. As
long as the judge applying the unreasonable foreseeable risk for-
mula defers, consciously or unconsciously, to his understanding of
preexistent social norms and their purposes, the formula is harm-
less enough, and, as so qualified, leads in a roundabout way to the
right answer.
It is possible, therefore, to restate modern negligence law in
pre-Holmesian terms. It would also be desirable to restate negli-
gence law in those terms, for four reasons. First, restatement in
those terms solves the troubling rule-of-law problems with negli-
gence law. The actor's conduct would be judged by a preexisting
rule, which was clear, definite, and certain-the community's appli-
cable safety convention. Second, the flexible capacity of negligence
law to reflect different communities' different safety conventions
would be restored, consistent with fairness and predictability.
Freed from the idea of a standard of universal reasonableness, the
judge and jury could focus on determining the relevant social norm
in the relevant smaller community.
Third, the way would open up for needed reforms that would
make application of negligence law more consistent, understand-
able, and fair. Jury instructions on the negligence standard are not
as clear as they could be. Early in the development of negligence
law, judges gave juries pointed advice on how to apply the negli-
gence standard to the specific facts and, by implication, on what
that standard meant. Without impairing the right to jury trial, we
could make it clearer to the jury that the ordinary reasonable per-
son question asks them to determine what plaintiff could legiti-
mately expect defendant to do or refrain from doing, given the
community's actual safety-coordinating convention and practices.
Moreover, once we identify the facts on which the negligence judg-
ment is to be made, we could recognize additional ways that plain-
tiffs and defendants could introduce evidence about social safety
conventions and practices without invading the province of the jury.
A third restatement could show judges that questions of duty
and proximate cause have definite, fact-based answers rooted in the
119. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281(b) cmt. f, illus. 3 (1965); see generally
4 HARPER ETAL., supra note 26, § 20.5.
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community's safety conventions and practices. Those judges, in
turn, could reinvigorate the tests that are most likely to identify
those answers. Simply asking judges or juries to decide questions of
duty, breach, and proximate cause according to preexisting social
safety conventions may not be enough, however, for a number of
reasons: (1) our social conventions are many and subtle; (2) we are
ordinarily not conscious of them, even when we act pursuant to
them; (3) in order for a social convention to be usable as a basis for
a negligence action, we must determine that it is a safety conven-
tion intended to prevent serious harm, and not just a rule of eti-
quette or manners. We may need to take an indirect route by elabo-
rating tests that identify the psychological or social consequences of
these conventions-their footprints, if you will. Luckily, we already
have a number of these tests. Some familiar judicial tests can be
understood as ways of. identifying the footprints of community
safety conventions. Consider, for example, the following reasoning
by Judge Andrews of the New York Court of Appeals in recognizing
a duty in a leading negligent misrepresentation case, International
Products Co. v. Erie R.R. Co.:
Not every casual response, not every idle word, however damaging the result, gives
rise to a cause of action .... Liability in such cases arises only where there is a
duty, if one speaks at all, to give the correct information. And that involves many
considerations. There must be knowledge, or its equivalent, that the information is
desired for a serious purpose; that he to whom it is given intends to rely and act
upon it; that, if false or erroneous, he will because of it be injured in person or
property. Finally, the relationship of the parties, arising out of contract or other-
wise, must be such that in morals and good conscience the one has the right to rely
upon the other for information, and the other giving the information owes a duty
to give it with care. An inquiry made of a stranger is one thing; of a person with
whom the inquirer has entered, or is about to enter into a contract concerning the
goods which are, or are to be, its subject, is another.'2
If we put ourselves in the position of people acting pursuant to a
community's accepted safety conventions, we can see that an actor
protected by the convention would rely on others to follow the con-
vention and would therefore coordinate her conduct with that of
others, assuming they would follow the convention. An actor whose
conduct is governed by the convention would know that those in-
tended to be protected by the convention would rely on him to follow
the convention. Both the actor protected by the convention and the
actor governed by the convention would realize that the protected
plaintiff would be subjected to a clearly identified hazard if the ac-
tor controlled by the convention fails to follow it. Thus, the combi-




nation of reliance by the plaintiff, knowledge of that reliance by the
defendant, and a foreseeable hazard to plaintiff or those like him
that can be avoided by defendant's proper conduct, are tell-tale
signs-psychological footprints-of a community safety standard.
Given the basic nature of community safety conventions, the
hazard/class test applied to statutes can also be applied to commu-
nity safety conventions to resolve duty or proximate cause ques-
tions, but a test using those precise terms may not be the most ef-
fective way to get at this social reality. Those who follow the safety
convention may neither be able to articulate the convention they
follow nor be able to articulate the purpose of that convention.
Here, too, it may be helpful to use an indirect approach that focuses
attention on the psychological footprints of the safety convention.
As we suggested above, the unreasonable foreseeable risk test
2 1
may be a good way to use the footprints of a convention to answer
the hazard question.
This discussion may help us understand better the problems
that courts and commentators have had with the ordinary reason-
able person standard. If we look at it in historical context, it seems
a sensible way of asking the jury to identify and apply the relevant
preexisting social safety convention. But if that is what it is in-
tended to do, it does it straight on, without using any of the psy-
chological or social footprints of the safety convention to help the
jury out. And it is not at all clear from the base form of the stan-
dard, taken out of historical context, that that is the question it
asks the jury. This was not a problem early on in the history of
negligence law, for perceptive trial judges like the estimable Chief
Justice Tindal of the Court of Common Pleas could surround the
bare-bones negligence formulation with additional helpful instruc-
tions to the jury.122 By these instructions, they focused the jury's
attention on the practical operation of a safety convention in the
particular case and on the psychological and social footprints of
that convention. In this way, they helped the jury identify the rele-
121. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Proctor v. Harris, 172 Eng. Rep. 729, 730 (C.P. 1830) (Tindal, C.J.). In that
case, a pub-keeper had opened the flap door in the sidewalk over his cellar to let in a butt of beor,
at night, with only the street lamps to light the opening. Plaintiff, a pedestrian, fell in and was
injured. In instructing the jury, Chief Justice Tindal said:
The question is, whether a proper degree of caution was used by the defendant.
He was not bound to resort to every mode of security that could be surmised,
but he was bound to use such a degree of care as would prevent a reasonable
person, acting with an ordinary degree of care, from receiving any injury. The




vant preexisting social facts: the existence and content of that con-
vention. If judges recover this understanding of the negligence
standard, they could perhaps elaborate standard subsidiary in-
structions that could today help juries focus on the preexisting so-
cial facts invoked by the negligence standard as originally under-
stood. One helpful addition might be an instruction relating the or-
dinary reasonable person standard to the conduct that someone in
plaintiffs position could reasonably have expected from someone in
defendant's position.
Finally, by understanding the open-ended forms in negli-
gence law as different ways of referring to preexisting facts about
social safety conventions and their purposes, we can also identify
the initial purpose of negligence liability. That purpose seems to be
to redress a private injustice, defined as an injury to plaintiff
caused by defendant's breach of a duty owed to plaintiff to follow
the community's coordinating conventions, which were intended to
protect plaintiff and people like her from the hazards that the
breach occasioned. 123 That purpose explains negligence law better
than competing purposive explanations, such as deterrence or loss
spreading. 24 That purpose makes sense out of the otherwise puz-
zling form of negligence law. Understanding that purpose gives us
the insight we need to restate negligence law so that in its opera-
tion it will be clear, certain, capable of uniform application, and
more effective at achieving its goal of corrective justice.
V. CONCLUSION
The primary object of the restatement project is to promote
clarity, certainty, and uniformity in the common law across the
United States. That object limits the form of a restatement to that
which can be applied uniformly to yield predictable, certain results.
The traditional common law of negligence seems to defy restate-
ment in that form, however, for duty, breach, and proximate
cause-three of the five elements of the negligence prima facie
case-seem to be irreducibly open-ended. The prevailing descriptive
theories of negligence liability, derived from Holmes's tort theory,
cannot seem to make these elements more certain, for they explain
the open-ended terms by using the equally open-ended notions of
foreseeability and public policy.
123. See Kelley, Who Decides?, supra note *, at 351-64.
124. See Patrick J. Kelley, Tort Reform, in NATURAL LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC
POLICY 298, 308-11 (David F. Forte ed., 1998).
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An analysis of negligence law as it had developed prior to
Holmes's theoretical description of it provides the basis for a differ-
ent description, which may solve the rule-of-law problems raised by
the seemingly open-ended elements of negligence. That analysis
suggests that the duty, breach, and proximate cause formulations
were adopted to focus on different aspects of preexisting social
facts: the existence of a community safety convention, its purpose,
and its applicability to the facts of the particular case. This under-
standing, in turn, provides a solution to the rule of law problems
with those formulations, as the rules and practices to which they
relate were adopted prior to the incident, gave clear guidance to
members of that community, and can be identified and applied by
courts and juries to resolve negligence claims. If we were to use this
understanding in restating negligence law, we could achieve the
restatement's basic goals of clarity, certainty, and uniform applica-
tion of the common law across the United States.
